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IN THE UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TAMMY BLUEMEL, 
Respondent/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No.20060586-SC 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20050208-CA 
ARGUMENT 
I. DESPITE BLUEMEL'S CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, RULE 
11 VIOLATIONS DO NOT EQUAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS. 
Bluemel claims "[t]he violations of rule 11 of the Utah rules of criminal procedure 
exceeded simple, harmless, technical violations, and rose to noncompliance with the 
constitutional requirements of rule 11. This noncompliance caused respondent's plea to be 
unknowing and involuntary." Resp. Br. at x.1 
This argument fails, chiefly because it assumes, without proper argument or legal 
support, precisely the point at issue, to wit: Whether or to what extent rule 11 requirements 
are co-extensive with constitutional requirements. In a sense, this failure is not surprising 
given that the Bluemel panel makes the same mistake. See, e.g., Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT 
App 141, Tf 17, 134 P.3d 181 ("[B]ecause noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the 
1
 The first eleven pages of petitioner's brief are numbered by Roman numerals; thus, 
page "x" is a reference to the 10th consecutive page of petitioner's brief. 
constitutional rights of the accused .. .we conclude that noncompliance with rule 11 readily 
falls within the interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA . . . .") (emphasis added; 
citation omitted).Moreover, as demonstrated in the State's opening brief, rulel 1 violations are 
not co-extensive with constitutional violations and only the latter would justify post-
conviction relief See State's opening brief, at 9-19; see also Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 
988, 992 (Utah 1993). Although this Court noted in Salazar that rule 11 is an important tool 
in ensuring that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary, it also held that rule 11 does not 
create or define the constitutional requirements for a constitutionally sound guilty plea. Id. at 
991. "Salazar does not claim any errors other than the purported failure to comply with Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5). Thus, he is entitled to relief only if the alleged violation 
of rule 11 is also a violation of his constitutional rights." Id. (emphasis added). 
Bluemel purports to make this argument. —the alleged rule 11 violations in her case 
were also a violation of her constitutional rights. She claims that, although rule 11 is 
"slightly broader than the constitutional requirements," Resp. Br. at 5, a failure to strictly 
comply with rule 11 in her case amounted to a constitutional violation. Specifically, 
Bluemel claims her plea was unknowing and involuntary because 
[u]pon examining the entire record, nothing suggests that Ms. Bluemel 
understood her right to presumption of innocence, the State's burden, her right 
to compel witnesses, or that a plea is an admission of all the facts.... Where 
the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 makes it impossible to 
conclusively determine whether or not defendant's plea was knowing and 
voluntary, the Rule 11 violation is a constitutional violation and the interests 
of justice require that she be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. 
Resp. Br. at 11. 
2 
This argument completely misses the mark. First, once the entire record is reviewed— 
as it must be, State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 2 8 4 12,114 p - 3 d 569—the rights Bluemel identifies 
are clearly present because they are all discussed in the written plea agreement. See R. 22-28 
(criminal case) (Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea). Second, even if the 
record did not show waiver of the above-named rights, this would not render the plea in fact 
unknowing and involuntary under recognized constitutional principles. See, e.g., Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243 (1969) (plea is in fact knowing and voluntary if there is a factual 
basis for the plea and the petitioner understands and waives privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses). 
In addition to the vexing legal impediments to Bluemel's claims before this Court, the 
procedural posture of this case makes her task even more daunting. This is because Bluemel 
is required to make an argument in support of the Bluemel opinion that does not derive in any 
obvious way from the opinion itself. Bluemel did not hold that the alleged rule 11 violations 
in taking Bluemel's plea violated her constitutional rights. Rather, Bluemel regarded the rule 
11 violations alone as sufficient to show that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. See, 
e.g., Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^ | 9-19 (repeated citation to various rule 11 requirements 
and language from cases concerning challenged to guilty pleas on direct appeal, but no 
discussion of or citation to Salazar). Thus, Bluemel is placed in the awkward position of 
defending the Bluemel opinion based on an argument the court of appeals either did not 
consider or at least did not articulate. These legal and procedural hurdles are insurmountable. 
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BluemeFs mistaken interpretation of rule 11 principles as embodying constitutional 
requirements leads to several erroneous subsidiary conclusions. For example, Bluemel states 
that "where the written plea statement was not incorporated into the record, it may not be 
reviewed to determine whether or not the plea was knowing and voluntary." Resp. Br. at 2 
(citing State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 110,120,69 P.3d 838). This statement might be correct 
if this case concerned the validity of a guilty plea challenged on direct appeal But, of course, 
this is not a direct appeal of BluemePs criminal conviction; rather, it is an appeal from a 
denial of claims contained in a post-conviction petition, which allows review of the complete 
record, including the written plea agreement, regardless of whether it was properly 
incorporated into the record in accordance with rule 11. See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (trial 
court "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the surrounding facts 
and circumstances, including the information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys 
before entering the plea"). 
Bluemel also takes issue with the State's assertion that her burden on post-conviction 
is to demonstrate that her plea was "in fact not knowing and voluntary." Resp. Br. at 5. "On a 
motion for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the record is insufficient to 
support that the plea was knowing and voluntary, which is quite different from proving that 
the plea is in fact not knowing and voluntary." Resp. Br. at 5 (citing State v. Mora, 2003 UT 
App 117, ^ J18, 69 P.3d 838). This statement is simply incorrect. The Utah Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act explicitly states that "[t]he petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Utah 
4 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004); see also Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (petitioner "must 
show that the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary"). Thus, it is Bluemel's 
burden to show that the plea was defective, not the State's to show that it was not. 
In sum, Bluemel's attempts to refurbish the Bluemel opinion by insisting that rule 11 
requirements are virtually identical to constitutional requirements must fail and this Court 
should reverse the court of appeals. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION 
AS TIME-BARRED AND BLUEMEL HAS NOT SHOWN A 
SUFFICIENTLY MERITORIOUS CLAIM OF INCAPACITY AT 
THE TIME OF HER PLEA TO EXCUSE HER TARDINESS. 
Bluemel claims that even if this Court were to reverse Bluemel for its mistaken reliance 
on rule 11 in a post-conviction context, it still could affirm on the alternative grounds that her 
plea was not knowing and voluntary because several prescription drugs allegedly impaired 
her at the time she entered the plea. Resp. Br. at 21. Further, Bluemel claims her alleged 
incapacity during the plea warrants excusing the tardiness of her petition, which was filed 
In fact, petitioner's briefs to the court of appeals seem to acknowledge this burden by 
deferring to the authority of Salazar, For instance, in her opening court of appeals brief, 
petitioner acknowledged that 
in order to obtain post conviction relief, a defendant "must show more than a 
violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he .. . must show that the 
plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. 
Accordingly, [petitioner] must also show that her guilty plea was actually 
unknowingly and involuntarily entered. 
Brief of the Appellant, dated June 21, 2005, at 24 {Bluemel v. State, case no. 20050208) 
(emphasis added). 
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more than a year too late, under the "interests of justice" exception to the one-year statute of 
limitations for pursuing post-conviction relief. On the contrary, if the Court reaches these 
issues, it should still reverse Bluemel and affirm the trial court. 
As discussed in the State's opening brief, at 20-21, a petition's tardiness may be 
excused in the "interests of justice" if a petitioner (1) can explain the reasons the petition was 
late and (2) present evidence and legal authority demonstrating that the petition presents a 
potentially meritorious claim. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, \ 16, 123 P.3d 400. "The 
petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to 
support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at ^ f 20. 
Bluemel does not meet the "interests of justice" exception under Adams. First, 
Bluemel has offered no credible explanation for waiting two years after her sentencing to file 
her post-conviction petition. Although she claims the one-year deadline had passed before 
she realized her attorney was not pursuing her request to file a petition, the post-conviction 
court properly found this excuse unconvincing: "Even if the first year is discounted as being 
the result of the bad counsel and advice from her first attorney, she still failed to act within the 
statutory limit to begin this action. No reason or excuse is provided for that behavior." R. 131 
(post-conviction case) 
Second, Bluemel has not raised any potentially meritorious claims. Bluemel argues 
that she was legally incompetent to plead guilty. The claims that: "When I entered the guilty 
pleas, I was under a doctor's care and taking Neurontin for mood stabilization, Effexor for 
depression, Xanax for panic attacks, Trazadone as a sleeping aid, Ibuprofen for menstrual 
6 
cramping, Macrodantin for post-intercourse pain and to prevent urinary tract infections, Axid 
for ulcers and heartburn, and Soma for muscle tension and migraine prevention." See R. 113 
(Affidavit of Tammy Bluemel, dated December 8, 2004). She also offers physician Doug 
Rollins' affidavit which states that "[t]he effect of these drugs, if taken together, on a person 
of Ms. Bluemel's stature would likely have impaired her cognitive functioning to a 
heightened degree." R. 10 (Affidavit of Doug E. Rollins, dated January 25, 2005). 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Bluemel's affidavits are ambiguous about the 
drugs she had actually taken immediately prior to her change-of-plea hearing and the 
impairment they could have caused. Dr. Rollins, who apparently never actually examined 
Bluemel, merely states that the medications prescribed for her would likely cause impairment 
"if taken together." R. 10. However, it is unclear whether the drugs mentioned had been 
taken together or when. Indeed, Bluemel's affidavit suggests they had not. For instance, 
Bluemel states that she had been prescribed Trazadone "as a sleeping aid," R. 31, which 
presumably means she may have taken the drug the night before and likely was no longer 
under its influence by the time of the hearing. Similarly, Bluemel's claims that she was 
taking "Ibuprofen for menstrual cramping, Macrodantin for post-intercourse pain and to 
prevent urinary tract infections," id, indicates that these drugs are taken only in response to 
certain specific maladies that may or may not have been present at the time of the hearing. 
Thus, Bluemel's evidence, even taken at face value, does not demonstrate that she was 
impaired at the time she entered her plea. 
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But even assuming Bluemel was under the influence of all of these medications at the 
time she entered her plea, there is nothing in the record to suggest impairment, let alone that 
the plea was unknowing or involuntary. She folly participated in the hearing by responding 
coherently to the court's questions, repeatedly affirming that she understood the contents of 
the Plea Statement, and that she was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving 
her constitutional rights. See R. 57:3-4; 146 (Video of plea hearing); 52-59 (Plea Statement). 
The trial court also had an opportunity to observe Bluemel's demeanor during the hearing and 
apparently saw nothing amiss. See R. 146 (Video). 
Moreover, Bluemel's written Plea Statement contains "Defendant's Certification of 
Voluntariness," which states that she read the statement (or had it read to her), and that she 
understood its contents. R. 55. It also affirmatively states that she was not impaired by any 
of the drugs she may have taken: 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently 
under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my 
judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally 
capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I 
am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me 
from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
Id. 
In addition, Bluemel's trial counsel signed a "Certificate of Defense Attorney." This 
certificate states in part that counsel discussed the plea with Bluemel and that counsel 
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"believe[s] t h a t . . . she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent." R. 54. 
During the plea hearing the Court expressly asked Bluemel if she had any questions 
about her written plea statement. Bluemel answered, "I don't, your Honor." See R 57:3; 146 
(Video at 11:17:25). During the plea hearing, Bluemel accurately and without hesitation 
answered the Court's questions. R. 57:3-5; 146 (Video atl 1:15:44 - 11:21:24). The Court 
stated: "I find Ms. Bluemel has knowingly and voluntarily entered her pleas." R. 57:5; 146 
(Video at 11:19:54). 
Bluemel acknowledges that the video and transcript of the plea hearing shows her 
answering the Court's questions. However, Bluemel asserts that the video of the change-of-
plea hearing shows that she is "distracted and fidgety . . . She repeatedly shifts her gaze 
around the courtroom and doesn't appear able to focus solely on the judge." Resp. Br. at 24. 
The State disagrees with this interpretation. A review of the video of the plea hearing shows 
that Bluemel appears to be paying close attention to the proceeding. In fact, after the Court 
set the date and time for sentencing, Bluemel's counsel asked: "At what time?" Video 
11:20:26. Bluemel accurately said "9:00" before the Court could even respond. Id at 
11:20:27.3 At one point, Bluemel appears to be looking toward the prosecution table, as was 
Petitioner's comment is apparent on the Video, but is not captured by the transcript. 
For this reason, and also because the Video is subject to different interpretations, the State 
urges the Court to review it firsthand. 
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her counsel, but only because the prosecutor who signed the plea agreement was apparently 
not present. 
In short, Bluemel has not demonstrated that her tardiness in filing her petition a year 
too late should be excused in the interest of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' Bluemel 
opinion and affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JCQAJL4A &. fdl^C^K Jfr 
BRETT J. DELPORTO ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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